(This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.j
10
Further south beyond the range of Consular tours there are no doubt many more similar independent hill tracts.
After over three years' experience I can assert that while international relations have improved, i.e., while Chinese Kachins have been largely restrained from com- mitting offences against our subjects, the internal condition of the Tengyueh frontier districts has deteriorated rather than improved. The Chinese Kachins have been and are increasing both in numbers and disorderliness. The Shans in the plains at least of Meng Wan and Meng Mao are on the contrary decreasing; part of the main Shan Valley of Meng Wan has recently fallen into the hands of the Kachins, who have turned out the Shan cultivators.
""
The Yunnan Government seems to be getting feebler and feebler, and what little the Chinese have done on the frontier has not been done proprio motu, but under strong and constant Consular pressure. Not the least attempt has been made to grasp the problem of Kachin administration. nor do the officials appear even to understand my representation that it is a shameful thing that hundreds of square miles "What can you of China should be wholly independent of the Chinese Government. expect? They are only wild men ; is the stereotyped reply of the Mandarins. Now if this is the state of affairs in districts casy of access to Tengyueh and traversed by several frequented trade routes, what in the future is likely to be the condition of those remote districts on the banks of the Irrawaddy (N'Maikha branch) if the shadowy claims of China to any part of them are admitted? I would wish to draw the special attention of His Majesty's Government to the extreme unwisdom of admitting Chinese claims to any territory on our borders, which is inhabited by wild tribes, as proved by our actual experience on the Bhamo frontier.
1 doubt, however, if it would be wise to press the Chinese Government to under- take operations to subdue their nominal Kachin subjects. I gather that British officers estimate that a force of 400-500 Ghurkas and a battery of mountain guns would be required. It is out of the question for the West Yunnan officials to put in The force would have to be the field a force anything like equivalent to that. supplied by special arrangements from Yünuan-fu, and the Yünnan-fu Government Yet it would be would oppose a stubborn resistance to anything of the kind. inadvisable for us to make a demand if we were not prepared to insist upon compliance.
If a Chinese force did get under weigh it would be in the last degree badly. organised and inefficient. The work of subjugating the Kachins would therefore take a long time, during which the whole of the frontier might be in a disturbed con- dition, which would be contrary to the political and commercial interests of Burmah, During the course of such operations, too, a number of undesirable Kachins might take refuge over the border in British territory, and cause trouble to our
officers.
Last, I think it is evident that the Chinese Government is sinking more and more into its dotage. Eventually and gradually these frontier districts must in the course of nature fall under British control. This process will be made easier if the Chinese are not encouraged to attempt to subdue the Kachins and establish military posts in these hills.
For these reasons I am of opinion that so long as we continue to obtain such 'satisfaction as we have received during the past two seasons, it would be prudent to leave matters as they are, while fully recognizing that the present state of things is not wholly satisfactory. I am addressing the Taotai, pointing out in general terms ■ that in no case has punishment been administered in a frontier case to the offenders, and that large tracts continue to be merely nominally part of the Chinese Empire; but I refrain from suggesting any remedy.
Inclosure 3 in No. 1.
Rough Sketch of Bhamo-Yunnan Frontier.
[Not printed.]
(
SOUTH-WEST CHINA.
CONFIDENTIAL.
No. 1.
426
[March 11.j
SECTION 2.
Sir E. Satow to the Marquess of Lansdowne.--Received March 11.)
(No. 33. Confidential.) My Lord,
Peking, January 23, 1905, I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's Consul-General at Chengtu, on the subject of the state of the country and people between Ta-chien-lu and the Thibetan frontier.
I have, &c.
ERNEST SATOW.
(No. 31. Confidential.)
Sir,
(Signed)
Inclosure in No. 1.
Consul-General Hosie to Sir E. Satow.
Chengtu, December 21, 1904. I HAVE the honour to report that during my recent journey to the Thibetan frontier, I became cognizant of several things which appear to me deserving of notice in a separate despatch.
The most important of these, and one which is particularly obnoxious to the Thibetan inhabitants of Ssuchuan, is the system of Ula or corvée transport which prevails to the west and north of Ta-chien-la. Along and within a certain distance of the high-roads all Thibetan families are compelled, on the requisition of the Chinese authorities presented through their chief, to supply, in turn, official and other travellers with transport animals, either without any payment whatever or for very inadequate remuneration. It is true that the obligation relieves them from payment of rent, and that the feeding of the animals en route costs nothing, but the owners or others deputed by them to accompany the caravans as drivers are withdrawn, it may be for many days, from their homes and their work, whether pastoral or agricultural. The Imperial and Assistant Imperial Residents for Thibet, for example, pay nothing for transport. contenting themselves with presenting gratuities, which by the time they reach the hands of the drivers are ludicrously inadequate, and lamas are entitled to transport at merely nominal rates, altogether insufficient to meet the expenses of the owners. The result is that the Thibetan inhabitants on and in the neighbourhood of the high-roads are deserting their homes; ruined houses are every- where common, and land is going out of cultivation. The Ming Chêng Ssă or native Chief of Chala, with whom I exchanged friendly visits at Ta-chien-lu, complained to me bitterly of the treatment which he and his people received at the hands of the Chinese authorities. He told me that he is frequently called upon to order his people to provide larger numbers of animals than they can possibly supply; that ou such occasions they have to hire from others, with the result that they are always on the verge of poverty; and that he has annually to distribute relief among the more necessitous. I may mention that the Chief of Chala, in spite of valuable presents which I saw made to him by the French Bishop for Thibet, whose head-quarters are at Ta-chien-lu, is on exceedingly friendly terms with British missionaries, with some of whom he has actually sworn brotherhood, explaining that he, like themselves, is a foreigner in China. He has great influence with the Chiefs of Litang and Batang, and was on by no means friendly terms with the ex-Dalai Lama of Thibet, who had even threatened to attack him.
The power of the lamaseries is far too great. This was especially evident in the State of Litang, where the lamus practically dictate their terms to the Chinese authorities. Some years ago two members of the China Inland Mission travelled as far west as Litang, and on arrival they were told by the lamas that their stay must not exceed two days. They had to go. At the present day the French Catholic
[1899 7-2]
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